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Abstract. In this paper, I assess Francis Bacon’s methodological 
considerations on the process of experimentation in order to show that 
experiments and experimentation have a productive role in his scientific 
inquiry.  By  looking  at  the  structure  of  the  problems  selected  for 
investigation, and at the ways they are addressed in the History of the Winds, I 
emphasize some of the epistemic functions of the experimentation process: 
the generation of new unknown effects, direct and essential contribution to 
conceptual innovation, the extension of the domain of research, and the 
pinning  down  of  the  essential  factors  for  producing  the  particular 
effect/phenomenon that is under study.  
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Introduction 
Is there a logic of discovery? This is one of the guiding questions of Bacon’s 
philosophical program. The widespread belief among both historians of scientific 
method and historians of the early modern period is that Bacon’s answer to this 
question is the intricate inductive model of the Novum organum. For the modern 
historian of philosophy, the methodological rules making up the first part of the 
second  book  of  the  Novum  organum  are  generally  considered  to  be  the  key  to 
understanding  Bacon’s  logic  of  natural  philosophical  discoveries.1  But  Novum 
organum includes also non-inductive methodological elements, like the prerogative 
instances (Latin: prerogativis instatiarum) that were overlooked until the beginning of 
the 70s when the seminal work of Graham Rees revived Bacon’s philosophy of 
experiment. 
These new methodological elements require integration in Bacon’s overall 
view of how knowledge is generated. Thus, if the inductive process seems to allude 
to a set of rules for avoiding the human mind’s tendency to rush to ungrounded 
conclusions, the prerogative instances refer to ways of generating good experiments 
(understood as the experiments that are appropriate for dealing with the research 
question). Although Bacon devoted more than a hundred pages of the New Organon 
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to explain how the twenty-seven types of prerogative instances should be used for 
natural philosophical purposes, this did not receive much attention. But, briefly put, 
the  prerogative  instances  refer  to  types  of  productive  experiments  or  specific 
instruments helpful for generating the natural and experimental histories.2 The way 
the  natural  and  experimental  histories  are  generated  is  an  interesting  topic  for 
further exploration, but the main theme of this paper relates to another aspect of 
the composition of such writings, namely the way the empirical data is organized in 
order  to  advance  and  ultimately  ground  knowledge.  Accepting  the  claim  that 
experientia literata is integrating and bounding empirical (experimental) knowledge in 
Bacon’s natural historical writings, in this paper, I will explore its value for the 
process of knowledge generation. 
Bacon’s  conception  of  experientia  literata,  and  of  the  ways  this  technique 
contributes to the advancement of knowledge, has captured the interest of Bacon 
scholars and historians of science only recently. The recent discussions over the 
content and structure of Bacon’s natural historical writings were accompanied by 
assessments of experientia literata. As a result of such studies, it has been suggested 
that  experientia  literata  provides  the  material  of  the  natural  and  experimental 
histories.3  How  is  this  done  and  in  what  way  it  contributes  to  the  natural 
philosophical form of knowledge are still open questions. Probably the earliest study 
dealing  with  the  place  experientia  literata  occupies  in  Bacon’s  philosophy  is  Lisa 
Jardine’s,  “Experientia  literata  or  Novum  organum:  Bacon’s  two  scientific  methods” 
(1985).4 The study suggests that the experientia literata technique is Bacon’s answer to 
skeptical worries about data gathering, and that it organizes the materials of the 
“primary natural history” and extends them to include new otherwise-uncorrelated 
instances.5 Jardine claims that with the help of experientia literata Bacon manages to 
identify the connections that reflect the nature of the world, rather than the mere 
constructions of the human mind that pervade the speculative forms of natural 
philosophy.  The  important  role  Jardine  attributes  to  experientia  literata  is  also 
accepted  and  underlined  by  Sophie  Weeks  in  “Mechanics  in  Bacon’s  Great 
Instauration.”6  Weeks  stresses  the  relevance  of  this  device  in  relation  to  the 
following functions: the fact that experientia literata helps generate experimenta lucifera 
(experiments of light) that contribute to the discovery of causes; and the fact that 
experientia literata is a help for memory.7 The aspect that is of utmost importance for 
Sophie Weeks’ approach, though, is experientia literata as a mode of discovery that 
works by transferring existing inventions or known processes from one mechanical 
domain  to  another.  Studies  such  as  Jardine’s  and  Weeks’  have  focused  on 
reconstructing Bacon’s view of experientia literata and the role it plays by carefully 
examining Bacon’s more methodological texts, leaving aside the actual composition 
of  the  natural  histories.  In  opposition  to  this  approach,  by  working  on  the 
deconstruction of the natural historical practice, Dana Jalobeanu has claimed that 
experientia literata is in fact Bacon’s answer to the very logic of discovery, and that the  
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key to unveiling Bacon’s view of how knowledge advances comes at the interplay 
between his matter theory and this art of experimentation.8  
Pursuing this line of investigation, in the analysis of the History of the Winds 
that follows, I point to some of the epistemic values of the experimentation process. 
I intend to show that experientia literata comprises a set of rules for securing the 
experimental facts and furthering the inquiry. I will show that a natural historical 
investigation of the type Bacon constructs in the History of the Winds is not about 
establishing the “final” causal explanation of the phenomenon, but rather about 
experimentally mapping out the empirical relations and conditions that influence or 
determine the ways in which the investigated effect is experienced. Such forms of 
investigation have epistemic priority because they attempt to make intelligible the 
properties and conditions of occurrence of the investigated effect. The epistemic 
priority is even more reinforced by the unknown character of some experimental 
results and by the fact that, at times, such experimental investigation conduces to 
conceptual innovations that become integrative parts of the local theories (the causal 
explanations  of  the  studied  phenomenon).  I  have  structured  my  argument  as 
follows: in the first part of the paper I present relevant aspects of Bacon’s own 
theorization of experientia literata and I then discuss how it is supposed to work. In 
the second part, I investigate the topical and experimental structure of the History of 
the Winds in order to show how the experimentation process produces scientific 
knowledge.  
 
The conceptualization of experientia literata and its integration within the 
Baconian natural and historical program 
  In  book  5  of  De  augmentis  scientiarum  (1623),  Bacon  introduces  four 
subdivisions  of  logic,  i.e.,  the  rational  arts  of  “Inquiry  or  Invention;  Art  of 
Examination  or  Judgment;  art  of  Custody  or Memory;  and  art  of  Elocution  or 
Tradition.”9  These  rational  arts  of  inquiry  are  devices  helpful  in  producing 
(inventing  that  which  is  sought),  grounding  (judging  that  which  is  invented), 
preserving (retaining that which is judged) and transmitting (delivering over that 
which is retained) knowledge.10 These rational arts represent the main directions of 
epistemological investigation for Bacon, and, as he makes evident, while the art of 
memory  and  the  art  of  elocution  deal  with  ways  to  properly  preserve  and  transmit 
knowledge,  the  arts  of  invention  and  examination  are  directly  related  to  producing 
knowledge.  Bacon seems  to  believe  that  a proper  method  for discovery  can  be 
ultimately formulated. If the art of examination scrutinizes the nature of proof and 
demonstration and comprises the analysis of both inductive (in the Baconian sense) 
and syllogistic (deductive) reasoning,11 the art of inquiry or invention deals with the 
rules and procedures by which the human mind might hope to obtain systematic 
knowledge. 
   The rational art of inquiry is in its turn divided into the art of discovering 
arguments and the art of discovering “arts” (sciences). The latter is the component  
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without  which  knowledge  itself  is  impossible,  because  it  deals  with  making  the 
intellect “by help of art a match for the nature of things.”12 Bacon states that such 
art is not about correcting the human mind, but about finding some rules so as to 
“urge things which are too subtle for the sense to some effect comprehensible by 
the  sense”13  and  to  avoid  the  “stumbled  upon”  type  of  knowledge  (chance 
discovery) that had previously dominated the physical inquiries. 
What a “logic” of scientific discovery is, or whether the dynamic scientific 
process actually conveys such a well-defined structure, is difficult to say. The rather 
new  discipline  that  integrates history and philosophy of science has revived the 
problem of a logic of scientific discovery in the context of an increased interest in 
analyzing  and  understanding  the  scientific  process  and  the  processes  of  theory 
generation.14  Yet  no  widely  accepted  answers  to  such  questions  have  been 
formulated. But, in its minimal sense, presumably, a “logic” of discovery should 
consists of a set of rules that guide the inquirer’s activity and help him generate what 
would be considered, in relation with a determinate set of values, reliable knowledge 
about the world. These minimum requirements can be found in Bacon’s texts. Thus, 
the  art of inventing  “arts”  (domains  of  knowledge) had  internal  methodological 
rules (rules for good experimentation, for example), some criteria to evaluate the 
“discoveries”  (one  such  example  would  be  the  requirement  to  manipulate  and 
actually put to use the experimental result15) and even a general purpose of the quest 
for knowledge (the restoration of man’s dominion over nature16). 
In this context, it seems safe to assume that Bacon had a particular interest 
in formulating a “method” for discovery. Yet, the Baconian texts raise a new puzzle. 
In De augmentis scientiarum Bacon proposes a two-fold division of the procedures of 
discovery:  the  method  presented  in  the  Novum  organum  (interpretatio  naturae)  and 
experientia literata.17 These two methods work differently: while interpretatio naturae 
proceeds from experiments to axioms and from these axioms to new experiments, 
experientia literata proceeds from one set of experiments to another as if one “may be 
led by the hand of another, without himself seeing anything” and, in consequence, it 
never ends with an axiom of nature. Both experientia literata and interpretatio naturae are 
parts of the same art. Yet how the two relate, or whether they are related at all, is 
still a point of argument in the secondary literature18: it is still unclear if experientia 
literata is Bacon’s alternative to the project of the eliminative induction or part of it. 
Moreover,  in  the  discussion  dedicated  to  art  of  invention  from  book  V  of  De 
augmentis, Bacon clarifies what is to be expected from experientia literata, but leaves 
aside the aspects of the method of the interpretatio naturae. We are informed that 
experientia  literata  technique  deals  with  the  process  of  experimentation  and  it 
generates experimentally based forms of knowledge.19  
As it is well known, for Bacon, any attempt at understanding the physical 
world has to be built around empirical sensorial information. Thus, experience is 
crucial for any physical investigation. But, in contrast with the more complicated 
discussion on the nature of experimentation and on the requisites a trial should  
 
 
Laura Georgescu - A new form of knowledge: experientia literata 
 
  108 
fulfill to be considered a good experiment that flourished in the second part of the 
seventeenth-century,  Bacon  equates  experiment  to  guided  experience.  Thus,  if 
experience  is  organized,  systematized  and  filtered  according  to  a  method,  those 
experiences cease to be “mere accidental experiences” and become “experiment.” 
For Bacon, an experiment is a set of observations and artifact situations that are 
relevant  for  the  problem  or  question  investigated.20  For  example,  in  De  fluxu  et 
refluxu maris, while trying to understand whether the motion of the tides is from east 
to west, Bacon brings forward three instances of some particular historical events 
labeling  them  as  “experiments.”21  Accordingly,  Bacon  identifies  three  ways  of 
incorporating the sensory information, all of which are associated with experimental 
forms of knowledge. The first form of integrating experiments into sciences is the 
empiric’s way: a process of experimentation that is chaotic, unordered, a kind of 
“groping in the dark,” that can at most stumble upon a “discovery.”22 The second 
form of experimentation has two main properties: direction and order “for keeping 
experience going and advancing it.”23 This is the way of experientia literata, a device 
that helps the human mind to proceed through experience securely “in accordance 
with a fixed law, in regular order, and without interruption”24 from one experiment 
to the other by means of the eight modes of experimentation. The third form of 
integrating experiments is the product of the interpretation of nature. De augmentis 
scientiarum  provides  no  actual  information  on  how  experiments  are  expected  to 
work.  The  difference  between  experientia  literata  and  the  experimentation  of  the 
interpretatio naturae resides within an analogy. Thus Bacon states that the integration 
of experiments in the natural philosophy is comparable to the way a man might try 
to find his path. Thus, whereas experientia literata is akin to a man groping in the dark, 
guided  by  the  hand,  the  experiments  associated  with  interpretatio  naturae  are  the 
equivalent of lightning a torch in one’s path. To what extent this analogy is revealing 
is hard to tell, but it does suggest that with research activities guided by experientia 
literata  the  researcher  is  only  following  the  rules  of  the  process  and  has  no 
anticipation of the experimental results. In case of interpretatio naturae, on the other 
hand, the experimental effect is known and put to test. 
Moreover,  Bacon  states  that  the  biggest  difference  between  these  two 
modes of discovery is the type of knowledge they provide. So, whereas interpretatio 
naturae  ends  with  axioms  of  a  lesser  or  higher  generality  that  are  “certain,”  the 
knowledge  obtained  as  a  result  of  a  natural  historical  activity  guided  by  the 
procedures of experientia literata has a hypothetical and provisional character.25 The 
discoveries of experientia literata are not submitted to questions of truth or certainty, 
because they just decompose the investigated phenomenon and analyze the factors 
involved either in its generation or its behaviour modification so as to make it make 
intelligible. In case of the knowledge obtained as a result of the method of experientia 
literata the grounding of the results is done on basis of the manipulability of the 
experimental results and their alleged practicability. On the contrary, the method of 
interpretatio naturae seems to be more interested in generating conceptual knowledge.  
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Moreover, experientia literata is the method chosen to explore the natural world and 
to build up the empirical correlations of things, whereas interpretatio naturae builds up 
the theories explaining the correlations. 
This is why Bacon is keen to assert that, rather than a science, experientia 
literata is a process of “hunting by scent,” a kind of sagacity guided by variation, 
production, translation, inversion, compulsion, application, coupling, and chances of 
experiments: the eight modes of experimentation.26 By means of these modes of 
experimentation, the experimental context is varied so as to extend the domain of 
investigation and generate new “discoveries” relevant for the problem under study. 
In what follows I shall briefly present what these eight ways of experientia literata are 
and how they are supposed to work. Looking at the way Bacon presents them in De 
augmentis they seem to be the legitimate ways of going from one experiment to 
another,  or  from  one  experimental  outcome  to  another.  With  their  help,  the 
information experimentally obtained is preserved and enchained in one explanatory 
structure. Moreover, for Bacon these forms of experimentation are a good indicator 
for how to draw good analogies, or true correlations of nature, that make for a good 
classificatory  scheme  (for  example,  establishing  a  relation  between  the  optical 
illusions that one can see in the sky and optical illusions seen around the flame of a 
candle provides a basis for grouping them together under a common heading). 
Variation is the experimental procedure by which specific parameters of the 
experimental setting are modified. One such parameter can be the type of object to 
which the experimental setting is applied: one observes that grafting is beneficial to 
fruit-bearing trees and subsequently attempts it in the case of wild trees or flowers 
(objects  with  similar  properties).27  Another  parameter  which  can  be  modified 
without altering the informative value of the experiment is the efficient cause. Thus, in 
order to answer the question of whether stars have the ability to emit heat, Bacon 
suggests replicating the experiment in which a lens is used to focus the light of the 
sun in order to light a fire. Immediately after this, Bacon advises that the same 
procedure  be  repeated  by  pointing  the  magnifying  glass  towards  the  Moon. 
Consequently, a new variation of the objects toward which the magnifying glass 
would  be  pointed  could  provide  some  insights  into  the  role  light  plays  in  this 
particular investigative context.28 A final type of parameter of the experiment that 
should be submitted to variation is quantity. Bacon proposes that the quantity should 
be  varied  in  almost  any  type  of  experimental  setting,  as  a  way  to  secure  the 
experimental results; especially given his belief that quantity “must be treated with 
great care, as it is surrounded by many errors.”29  
The second mode of experimentation regards the production of the experiment, 
understood either as the iteration or repetition of an experiment, or as the situation 
in which an experiment is led toward the production of a more subtle effect. The 
examples Bacon offers (e.g., his experiments with the magnetic needle) indicate that, 
ultimately, the production mode is nothing more than a particular species of variation 
used to unveil otherwise unknown effects. The translation of the experiment can be  
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of three kinds: from nature to art, from one type of art to another, or from one part 
of an art to another part of the same art. This type of experimentation implies the 
artificial  imitation  of  natural  phenomena,  such  as  generating  artificial  rainbows, 
inventing eyeglasses in order to improve sight, and artificial freezing with salt. It 
comprises  attempts  to  transmute  firmly  the  information  from  one  domain  to 
another. Inversion is the type of experiment applied to the counterpart of a substance 
or  object  for  which  the  experiment  had  been  designed  initially.  This  type  of 
experimentation strategy seems to accord with the Baconian theory of matter and 
the identification of some pairs of opposite cardinal virtues as basic processes: hot–
cold,  dense–rare,  etc.  The  compulsion  mode  is  a  form  of  experimentation  that 
establishes the boundaries of an experimental effect; Bacon’s examples include the 
limit distances at which magnetism can be experienced, and the actual limits of the 
magnifying  power  of  looking  glass.30  By  establishing  the  limits,  the  identified 
relevant factors for the effect’s occurrence are tested. The application and coupling are 
modes of experimentation associated with translating the results of a proven useful 
experiment to another experiment, and thus extending the domain of investigation, 
further comprising many other effects under the classificatory scheme that the initial 
experiment has set. Application and coupling are also associated with simply assessing 
other previously-obtained experimental results. These tokens of experimentation are 
constrained to work on non-specifically designed experiments so as to allow for the 
continuous manipulation of the parameters and thus the extension of the field of 
natural history. 
A set of distinctive features of the experientia literata device can be identified: 
the experiment must not have an intricate design (to permit the constant variation 
of the parameters); the experimental results are not known beforehand, but because 
the  experiment  proceeds  through  the  modes  of  experimentation  the  results  are 
considered relevant and objective. All these features are interrelated: it is precisely 
because  the  experiment  is  not  designed  to  test  a  hypothesis,  but  to  explore  a 
particular problem that the experimental setting can be varied; and the experimental 
results are taken to be reliable precisely because the law of experimentation is in 
place.  And  the  novelty  of  the  experimental  results  is  part  of  what  explains  the 
productive role of experientia literata and its epistemic character. All these features 
underline Bacon’s point, according to which the research activity, when dealing with 
a subtle effect of nature that the human senses and ultimately the human mind 
cannot grasp, has to deconstruct the effect and make it comprehensible for the 
human  senses.  The  deconstruction  implies  the  mapping  of  all  the  relevant  and 
necessary conditions for the occurrence of the effect investigated, or of the changes 
observed in its behavior. This is the most valuable function of experientia literata. 
Since  it  works  by  systematically  varying  some  conditions  or  by  establishing  the 
appropriate analogies, it helps to map out and dissect the investigated thing and to 
advance knowledge by establishing empirical regularities (if A under X conditions, 
then C), and in return to continuously generate new relevant problems. The results  
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secured by the experimental process become the ‘scientific’ facts.31 Experientia literata is 
not  a  device  for  constructing  the  setting  of  the  experiment,  or  for  generating 
experiments from which to construct natural histories (for Bacon, the methodology 
that  generates  an  experiment  that  advances  knowledge  about  the  topic  under 
investigation comes in the form of the prerogative instances). Instead, experientia 
literata is a technique that shows the ways in which an experiment can continue to be 
informative, can produce new tests and new experiments, and can maintain the 
“experience advancing.” 
In the first book of the Novum organum, Bacon suggests that experientia literata 
is a technique that should build up the natural and experimental histories, not only 
because  the  experiments  of  the  mechanical  arts  have  to  be  part  of  the  natural 
histories, but also because “[s]o far mental effort has had a much more important 
part to play in discovering [in inueniendo] than has writing, and indeed experience has 
yet to be made literate. And no discovery should be sanctioned save that it be put in 
writing  [Atquinulla  nisi  de  Scripto  inuentio  probanda  est].  Only  when  that  becomes 
standard practice, with experience at last becoming literate, should we hope for 
better things.”32 I take this to point to two things: first that experientia literata as a 
method of discovery is composed of strict rules – the modes of experimentation 
that must be thoroughly followed in composing the actual natural and experimental 
history.  The  rules  of  experientia  literata  work  as  a  mechanism  warranting  the 
advancement of understanding independent of the natural inclinations or abilities of 
the  researcher.  And  second,  that  experientia  literata  is  also  a  form  of  preserving 
knowledge and that, because it entails an order and a method, it acts also as a 
ministration of memory. The recording and organization of the activity suggested by 
the modes of experimentation have to correspond to the order of the composition 
of the natural histories, and the order of the information thus presented should 
prepare  the  empirical  data  thus  obtained  for  being  gathered  into  tables  and 
theorized upon. 
 
Experientia literata in the History of the Winds 
Historia Ventorum (History of the Winds) was published in 1622 as the first part 
of the Historia naturalis, the third division of the Instauratio magna in a volume entitled 
“Historia naturalis et experimentalis ad condemnam Philosophiam: sive Phaenomena universi.” 
The history is composed in accordance with the short text of the “Rules of present 
history,” and it includes entries such as the articles of inquiry – topics of interest 
that  the  natural  historian  has  to  study;  interspersed  “admonitions  and  cautions 
concerning the fallacies of things, and the errors and scruples which may occur in 
inquiry and discovery;”33 directions for how one can construct experiments of light and 
instances of special powers (prerogative); and provisional rules helpful in advancing the 
inquiry. 
The natural history of the winds is constructed around a list of thirty-three 
articles of inquiry into the nature and properties of the wind. Yet, in the exposition,  
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not all questions get to be fully addressed, indicating the open character of the 
history.  The  type  of  questions  Bacon  proposes  suggests  not  only  the  variable 
character of the subject under investigation, but also the exploratory character of the 
Baconian natural histories. Moreover, to facilitate and direct the investigation, the 
topics are grouped into several categories: the classification of winds (articles 1–10), 
the confacients of the winds (11–15), the limits of the winds(16–18), their succession 
(19–21),  motions  (2–-27),  the  force  or  powers  of  the  winds  and  their  qualities 
(articles 7, 28-31). The next article of inquiry presents some modalities to make 
some  prognostics  of  the  winds  possible,  while  the  final  one  investigating  the 
possibility  of  imitating  the  winds.  These  categories  suggest  that  such  forms  of 
investigation attempt to understand the phenomenon by establishing all the relevant 
factors  that  contribute  to  the  observable  modifications  of  the  behavior  and 
properties of the winds, and by providing a classificatory system of the relations 
identified.  
  When  addressing  the  question  of the  classification  of  the  winds,  Bacon 
proposes two categories of classification, after the names of the winds and their 
species. He identifies four types of species in relation to their cyclicity: general – 
winds that blow always; periodical – winds that blow at particular times; attendant – 
winds that blow more frequently; and free winds.34 Of the four identified species the 
one that is of utmost importance for Bacon is the species of the general winds – in 
particular, the wind that blows from east to west in the tropics, because in Bacon’s 
cosmology the heavens are moving from east to west around a central fixed Earth, 
as suggested in Thema coeli (1612).35 One of the problems raised by the investigation 
of the heavens is whether this motion is particular only to the heavens, or whether it 
also pertains to earth and earthy things. This question is reassessed in relation to the 
motion of the sea in De fluxu et refluxu maris, where it is established that the motion 
of the waters is regular and from east to west, and from this inferred that the diurnal 
motion of the heavens is also found at the sub-lunar level. In the same context, the 
problem of a general wind blowing from east to west is addressed. Bacon’s major 
point is that if one can find a general wind that blows weakly but permanently from 
east to west, then, by an analogical leap, it can be maintained that the diurnal motion 
is also a property of terrestrial phenomena.36 Its presence would be further proof 
that the lower and upper regions display the same behavior and that there is no 
division between the sublunary and the celestial sphere. The problem of the general 
winds has two components: whether the general wind blowing from east to west 
exists and, if it does, what its cause is. In itself, the inquiry looks like a draft rather 
than a complete and coherent explanation. 
On the question of the existence of this type of basic general and universal 
wind, Bacon gives two instances in support of its existence: the manifestation of a 
continuous Brize at the tropics, and the movement of higher clouds from east to 
west in calm nights. He also identifies a more problematic instance: the difficulty 
with which the wind can be observed on the European continent. In order to test  
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the  presence  of  the  general  wind  on  the  continent  he  suggests  an  experiment 
involving  an  indirect  phenomenon:  in situation of  perfect  calm,  when  no  other 
particular wind interferes with the general wind, to test whether the weathercocks 
and wind vanes point to the west. The narrative provides no indication of whether 
such an experiment is even possible. On the question of its cause, Bacon suggests 
two  possible  answers: the general  wind  from  east to  west  can  be  caused  either 
because the heat of the Sun expands the air, or because the airy terrestrial motion is 
part of the universal motion. For coherency with his cosmological system, the cause 
of  the  general  wind  blowing  from  east  to  west  (the  Brize)  should  have  been 
presupposed to be the latter. Instead, in order to push the investigation further 
Bacon suggests appealing to an experiment that would play the role of a Crucial 
Instance so as to establish whether the Brize is felt at night when the heat of the Sun 
cease. 
Crucial Instances are usually read by Baconian scholars as tests deciding 
which of two alternative hypotheses is confirmed. For such a reading, the fact that 
the  Brize  will  blow  at  night  is  both  a  clear  refutation  of  the  hypothesis  of  the 
overheating of the air and a confirmation of a uniform and continuous motion from 
East to West. However, in Bacon’s explanation of Crucial Instances, in the Novum 
organum, they are not exclusively related to evidence – they are not confirmatory 
instances. A Crucial Instance can be useful in rejecting some of the arguments of the 
alternative theories, but it does not stand as a confirmatory instance.37 Moreover, 
although the actual design of the experiment is not specified, the exposition of the 
natural history seems to suggest a negative result: “but it is certain that this Brize 
does not blow in the night but that it blows in the morning and even some time 
after sunrise.”38 Such crucial instances, as the text itself suggests, do not end the 
inquiry but further it. In fact the very provisional and open character of the natural 
historical data announces to the modern reader that, for Bacon, the empirical data 
could not have been used as evidence for the confirmation of any theory. Multiple 
and varied types of instances that are brought into the natural history as evidence of 
cases compatible with a particular hypothesis increase the likelihood of the adequacy 
of  the  hypothesis,  but  never  act  as  confirmatory  instances.  More  importantly, 
empirical data is taken to be productive for the inquiry if it opens new avenues of 
research or offers new directions for exploring the physical process or phenomenon 
investigated. 
The classification of winds according to the species allows one to observe 
the birth of a new concept: the attendant winds – winds that blow in all but one part 
of a country, with a “contrary wind” blowing in the remaining part. With this new 
concept, Bacon also generates a new map of winds. The new system of classification 
will  be  integrated  not  only  in  making  the  phenomenon  coherent,  but  also  in 
constructing a local theory explaining it. Such conceptual innovation is not a unique 
event throughout the exposition of the history. When discussing the local origin of 
the periodical winds, Bacon identifies three: from the hollows of the earth39; from  
 
 
Laura Georgescu - A new form of knowledge: experientia literata 
 
  114 
the middle region of the earth before or after the collection of vapours into clouds40; 
or from the expansion or contraction of the air. Bacon lists a series of observations 
derived from Gilbert, Acosta and Pliny, supporting the hypotheses that winds can 
originate both from the air and from above. The third source, of the body of the air, 
is Bacon’s own conception of the generation of winds.41 The explanation is based 
on an experimental fact already addressed in other Baconian texts (Phenomena universi, 
Historia  densi  et  rari,  Novum  organum),  according  to  which  a  quantity  of  water 
transforms into a much bigger quantity of air. The conversion of water into air 
overcharges the air and produces “disturbances on the way,” and thus winds.42  
  The next topic of the history is the naturalization of some “extraordinary 
and prodigious winds, as fiery winds, whirlwinds and hurricanes,”43 followed by a 
set of questions intended to establish the empirical conditions (the factors celestial 
or terrestrial) that contribute to exciting or calming the wind: meteors, earthquakes, 
rain showers as celestial factors; and soil conditions, melting of the snow, and so on, 
as terrestrial factors. Such inquiry is interested in investigating what types of other 
natural phenomena are relevant for determining the properties and the qualities of 
the particular species of wind. The result is not supposed to be a complete causal 
explanation, but a more detailed map of the phenomenon. Thus, although Bacon 
acknowledges that “every impulse of the air is a wind,” establishing why this effect 
is experienced in so many different ways implies establishing the particular necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of a particular effect. Only when the 
empirical correlations are established will the predictions become a possibility. 
A large part of the study of the winds is devoted to the study of some 
aspects  of  the  motions  of  the  winds.  Bacon  submits  to  exploration  a  series  of 
observable  properties  of  the  motion:  the  factors  that  increase  or  decrease  the 
motion of the wind, the direction of the motion, the longitude of the motion, and 
its undulation.44 In order to study the motion of the wind, Bacon appeals, along 
with particular historical events, to an experiment that was initially designed to study 
the generation of the winds: the tower experiment. This experiment is an analogical 
reconstruction of the effect that the sun’s heat has on the air. What Bacon proposes 
is a simple and ingenious experimental setting: in a round, shut tower, a bunch of 
“thoroughly ignited” coals are placed in the middle of the room. At one side of the 
tower, a thread with some feathers is suspended. Since the air is dilated as a result of 
the  heating,  Bacon  observes  that  the  feathers  are  permeated  with  an  oscillatory 
motion.45 In order to better grasp what is happening, the experimental conditions 
are  adjusted:  a  hole  in  the  tower’s  window  allows  Bacon  to  observe  a  new 
unexpected effect – the fact that the direction of the motion of the feathers is 
continuous, “intermittent, and in undulating currents.”46 
By multiple variations of the experimental setting, Bacon concludes that 
overcharging  the  air  can  produce  winds. He  now  uses  the  experiment  that  was 
initially designed to understand the effects of heat in relation to the generation of 
winds in a new context: in order to explore the motion of the winds. Thus, by  
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replacing the hot coals with a kettle of boiling water, not only is it established that 
vapours  contribute  to  the  formation  of  winds,  but  it  is  also  observed  that  the 
feathers moved more slowly, because the “heat was not strong enough to prevent 
the dewy vapour of the water from hanging in the air, and could not dissipate it into 
the matter of wind.”47 Another variant of his explanation of the efficient cause 
combines the effects of the coals with those of the boiling water, observing that the 
motion of the feathers is increased, “so that it appears sometimes to be lifted up as 
by a small whirlwind.” Thus, the experiment is transferred from one problem to 
another,  and  different  aspects  of  the  experimental  setting  illuminate  different 
aspects of the phenomenon investigated. It is to be observed that many of the 
effects that the experiment brought about (the undulating motion of the feathers, 
the  slow  motion  of  the  feathers  under  the  action  of  the  water  vapours)  were 
unexpected and became evident only as a result of the process of experimentation. 
Thus it is not the experiment per se as an exclusive discrete event contributing to 
increasing the understanding of the phenomenon, but the process of variation and 
manipulation of the experimental parameters – what Bacon terms experientia literata – 
that plays the productive role in the inquiry. 
Beyond  studying  the  properties  of  the  motion  of  the  air,  Bacon  also 
proposes an investigation of how the wind’s motion manifests itself in machines, 
especially sails and windmills. The study of the motion of the windmills is nothing 
other than one experimental set-up varied in different ways. The main rationale 
behind the experiment is Bacon’s attempt to understand how the speed of rotation 
of the windmills could be increased. The experiment attempts to test the motion of 
the windmills by simulating the effect. The technique used (according to the modes 
of experimentation that experientia literata comprises) is the translation of one art (the 
motion of the windmills) into another art, by analogizing from the motion of the 
windmills to the motion of the paper sails. Bacon does not generally addresses the 
question of whether the analogy is legitimate or not, but along with the technique of 
translation  of  the  experientia  literata  heuristic,  the  doctrines  of  the  ontological 
dissolution of the natural and artificial48 and the doctrine of the unity of the motions 
of matter support the extension/translation of the experimental results from one 
situation  to  another.  In  order  to  recreate  the  motion  of  the  windmills,  Bacon 
proposes as instruments some paper sails to model the sails of the windmills, and a 
pair of bellows to simulate the wind’s motion. Stipulating that the reason for the 
way the wings move is the very interaction of the air particles with the inclined 
surface of the sails, Bacon tries to understand which environmental factor is decisive 
for the speed of the motion. The way to solve the problem is by varying some 
parameters of the experimental setting. The first attempt is to change the shape of 
the surface of the wing by adding a fold in the direction opposite to that of the 
wind.  This  variation  has  the  reverse  effect:  it  reduces  the  speed  of  rotation. 
Although  a  negative  result,  such  variation  has  a  positive  effect  for  the 
understanding: in this way, one can know that the percussion of the wind has to be  
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in fact increased and not undermined. This situation shows in a simple way how 
experiments are in fact necessary for rendering some effects of nature intelligible. 
Besides the emphasis on using some experimental results for practical applications, 
this experiment has also a more fundamental role: unveiling what types of factors 
influence  or  determine  the  type  of  motion  we  see  in  windmills,  and  in  return 
opening  new  directions  of  inquiry  into  problems  related  to  the  motions  of  the 
winds. 
In  the  next  context  of  experimental  variation,  Bacon  places  a  series  of 
obstacles behind the wings, thinking that by compressing the wind more, the wind 
will  strike  with  greater  force.  The  effect  is  once  again  negative  since  the 
“repercussion”  is  absorbed  the  initial  motion.  Bacon  decides  to  introduce  the 
negative  results  into  the  narrative  not  only  to  point  out  the  limitations  of  the 
experiment  itself,  but  also  because  he  holds  the  conviction  that  negative 
experimental results have an instructive role and further the inquiry. The way Bacon 
understands  what  is  instructive  is  different  from  the  way  Aristotelian  science 
assesses experiments. For an Aristotelian the experiments teach by exposition, by 
showing how things are; the researcher is an authoritative figure who leads the way 
and  shows,  with  the  help  of  instruments,  how  things  are.  The  Aristotelian 
experiment demonstrates.49 In contrast, for Bacon, the experiment has a different kind 
of “pedagogical” role: it gives one the opportunity to explore, to research, to find 
out for oneself how things might cohere. What secures the experimental result and 
makes possible the replication of the experimental process is its reliance on the eight 
modes of experimentation and the natural historical exposition.  
In  a  last  attempt  presented  in  the  narrative  of  the  experiment  of  the 
windmill, Bacon uses another form of variation: the increase of the surface of the 
wings, so as to make the lateral impact stronger by intensifying the compression of 
the air. Thus, by translating a natural occurrence into an artificial setting and by 
using  some  variations  of  the  experimental  setting  (precisely  the  techniques  of 
experientia literata), Bacon manages to isolate the decisive factor needed for increasing 
the speed of the wings: their surface area. In fact, it is also by means of another 
technique of experientia literata (the production of a more subtle effect) that Bacon 
suggests how this enquiry should proceed. As such, he claims that another relevant 
factor besides the width of the wings might be the number of wings. Therefore, 
from an epistemic point of view, with such experiments Bacon proposes to establish 
both the accidental, irrelevant, environmental factors and the necessary conditions 
for the phenomenon to occur. This example shows that the experimental variations 
are used for solving specific problems, such as the rotation of the wings and how to 
control  it,  or  for  establishing,  along  with  the  already  stipulated  cause,  the 
environmental conditions that bring about the phenomenon.  
The History of the Winds has not received much attention among Baconian 
scholars. In line with other of Bacon’s natural histories, it appears to be fragmentary 
and to a certain extent unnecessary. Its value it is not in its content but in the ways  
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in which the techniques for constructing good natural histories, and the device of 
the good experimentation, experientia literata, intertwine to generate valuable natural 
historical  data  in  the  form  of  experimental  facts.  That  experientia  literata  is  the 
technique constructing the data of the natural histories explains their probationary 
and  non-doctrinal  (non-theoretical)  character.  Yet  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
natural histories are not valuable forms of knowledge. As shown above, the rule-
based  process  of  experimentation  that  Bacon  proposes  may  not  be  enough  to 
generate a final causal explanation, but it instead generates an open-ended inquiry. 
With the help of the modes of experimentation, it connects dissimilar empirical 
events, maps out properties and specific patterns of the investigated phenomena, 
and renders the natural historical information productive for new practical results. 
 
Conclusion 
  This  paper  investigated  Bacon’s  proposal  for  an  art  of  good 
experimentation,  experientia  literata,  by  exposing  some  of  the  ways  in  which 
experiments were included in the History of the Winds. By doing so, I unveiled the 
ways  in  which  experientia  literata  is  valuable  and  integral  to  the  natural  historical 
investigation. It has been shown that experientia literata techniques address a more 
basic but still productive stage of inquiry that deals with mapping out the physical 
process  or  phenomenon  investigated,  without  attempting  to  provide  a  causal 
explanation.  It  was  pointed  out that experientia  literata is  at  least one  of Bacon’s 
answers to the problem of discovery, because it encompasses a set of rules for 
organizing and advancing experience. Moreover, the following epistemic functions 
have been associated with the procedure of experientia literata throughout the paper: 
the delineation of the essential factors for the phenomenon’s occurrence and thus 
the  identification  of  the  relations  of  dependency;  the  generation  of  previously 
unknown effects which result in conceptual innovations that might sometimes even 
contribute  to  local  explanations  of  some  properties  or  behavior  of  the  process 
investigated; and the extension of the domain of investigation through the inclusion 
of  otherwise  disconnected  phenomena  and  the  establishment  of  empirical 
regularities. 
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